Interview with Samantha Frost, ‘Attentive Body’: Epigenetic Processes and the Self-formative Subjectivity by Tamari, Tomoko
Tamari, Tomoko. 2021. Interview with Samantha Frost, ‘Attentive Body’: Epigenetic Processes
and the Self-formative Subjectivity. Body & Society, ISSN 1357-034X [Article] (Forthcoming)
http://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/29940/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For
more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk
 1 
Interview with Samantha Frost, ‘Attentive Body’: Epigenetic Processes 
and the Self-formative Subjectivity 
 




The interview is a follow up from Samantha Frost’s paper, ‘The Attentive Body: 
How the Indexicality of Epigenetic Processes Enriches Our Understanding of 
Embodied Subjectivity’ in Body & Society 26(4): 3-34.  Tomoko Tamari invites 
Frost to explore her interest in ‘biocultural creatures,’ which led a focus on ‘bodies’ 
responsive self-transformation’ in epigenetic processes, and unfolds Peirce’s 
account of the index for understanding meaning-making in biological processes. 
 Tamari also introduces Katherine Hayles’s notion of ‘cognitive nonconscious’ to 
raise the question of the possible theoretical and mechanical 
similarities/discrepancies between epigenetic processes in organisms and the 
meaning-making process in computational systems. Drawing on Jacob von 
Uexkull’s notion of ‘umwelt’ and introducing Yoshimi Kawade’s remarks on a living 
being’s subjective orientation in environments, a further question about ‘intention’ 
and ‘subjectivity’ enables Frost to unpack her notion of ‘the attentive self’ and 
discuss its relation to ‘intentionality’ and ‘referentiality’ in epigenetic processes. 
Finally, Samantha Frost remarks on current projects that seek to explore the 
connection between ‘attention-as-responsive-self-transformation and ‘mode-of-
living-as-form-of-live’. 
The biosemiotics view of the living body presented in your paper leads us to go 
beyond the mechanical view of organism functionality and formation process of 
subjectivity. This challenge asks us to combine biology and semiotics in order to 
explore the complex mechanism of meaning-making in organisms and to capture 
‘the attentive body’ and ‘embodied subjectivity.’  You argue that the concept of 
the attentive body helps us make a bridge between the body as matter and 




l (Tomoko Tamari) You mentioned that this article was germinated at the 
‘Matters of perception: Objects and materialities of affects’ seminar at the 
Kent Summer School in Critical Theory (2016) and developed through 
participating in several conferences (2016-2017) as well as being stimulated 
by conversations with many colleagues. Could you say a little more about 
your initial point of departure and how your ideas have developed over time? 
  
(Sam Frost) In Biocultural Creatures, my work was focused on how, precisely, we 
might think what a person is if there is no part of their biological body that has not 
been materially and socially cultured. My second discipline training in molecular and 
cellular biology had made it pretty clear to me that there are no purely biological 
phenomena—down to their tiniest parts, bodies are biocultural or biosocial. And yet, 
many of the categories, concepts, figures, and logics that we use to think about 
subjectivity rely in some way on a qualitative distinction between biological 
processes and mind/culture/meaning. For me, the concepts of embeddedness, 
interaction, intra-action, and entanglement, while capturing or representing a state of 
being, did not give me enough texture or purchase for thinking deeply and in 
conceptual detail about how biocultural processes in an embodied self proceed, or 
what the logic of those processes might mean for many of the concepts that are 
cognate with our thinking about embodiment and subjectivity. So, Biocultural 
Creatures was my effort to elaborate the concepts and figures of movement that I 
needed to think about the biocultural: how should we think about the relationship 
between energy and matter when consider how bodies work? What counts as a body 
or self when the boundaries of the body and self are porous? How does the notion of 
a biocultural creature help us think around biological or environmental determinism? 
What understandings of time, temporality, and history do we need when we think of 
humans as biocultural creatures?  
While I did manage to elaborate concepts that help us think with the notion of 
the biocultural, I did not explore meaning or meaning-making. I foregrounded the 
many ways that bodies are responsive to their lived worlds but I did not explore the 
quality of that responsiveness, the quality of the forms of responsive self-
transformation. So the challenge posed to me by my own thinking was to figure out 
how to articulate scientifically-grounded insights about responsive self-
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transformation in conceptual and theoretical terms that might be useful for a theory 
of subjectivity. The seminar I taught at the Kent Summer School in Critical Theory 
was coordinated by Connal Parsley and Maria Drakopoulou and was a timely 
opportunity for me to begin thinking about how to articulate that question about 
quality and meaning. I had a sense that the notion of the biocultural would require a 
displacement of language and representation—not their dismissal but instead a 
decentering that might allow other dimensions of a biocultural self’s engagement 
with the world to emerge as foci of analysis. Consequently, in the seminar, we worked 
through a range of texts that portray forms of perception that are not primarily 
linguistic or visual: we considered proprioception, the perception of gravity, hearing 
and acoustics, blindsight, the immune system, animal perception, heliotropism, 
movement in architectural space, extended cognition, synaesthesia. The seminar was 
basically a stint of intellectual calisthenics to loosen up the conceptual strictures of 
dominant understandings of perception so that I could then play around with different 
possibilities for what perception might be and where it might take place.  
It takes me forever to develop an idea and write it out in a way that satisfies me. 
So after the seminar, I wrote a draft of the “Attentive Body” essay and then reworked 
it for a couple of years until it said what I needed it to say. I was lucky to be able to 
present versions of it around and about—and people’s questions and comments were 
tremendously helpful in alerting me to where the ideas were fuzzy, where I needed 
to be bolder, and so on. 
 
  
l (TT) You introduced Michelle Jamieson who argues that ‘to capture 
theoretically the entanglement of life and meaning’, it is important to consider 
‘how biological matter becomes saturated with the effects of social and 
political life’ as well as ‘how biological processes generate meaning or 
knowledge out of those effects’. Could you say a little more about why 
Jamieson’s remarks are important for your approach? And why you 
particularly chose ‘epigenetics processes’ as the main field for your 
theoretical focus on the ‘attentive body’? 
(SF) There is a slew of scholars who explore how what I call biocultural creatures 
are responsive in their bodies to the social and material dimensions of their lived 
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worlds—I’m thinking here, just to name a few, of Elizabeth Grosz, Elizabeth Wilson, 
Anne Fausto-Sterling, Arun Saldanha, Nikolas Rose, Michelle Murphy, Deborah 
Youdell, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, Maurizio Melonio, Rachel Lee. It is a really rich 
field of scholarship. What I particularly liked about Jamieson’s elaboration of 
Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy is her suggestion that the responsive self-
transformation we can see in bodies is not a mere mechanistic reaction but instead is 
a form of perceptual cognition and meaning-making. In her argument, it is not just 
that meaning is imposed on bodies or absorbed by them in ways that directly or 
indirectly affect biological processes but also that a body’s responsiveness to those 
impositions and absorptions is in itself meaningful. For me, Jamieson’s argument was 
a means to connect conceptually work in social and political theory on how bodies 
are affected by politics with work in zoosemiotics and biosemiotics on the processes 
by which nonhuman living creatures generate meaning in the course of living. 
To think about biological processes as meaningful for the creature in whom they 
unfold is to decenter or dislocate our sense of where the self is—or perhaps to 
disperse a sense of self beyond linguistic subjectivity and the ley lines of 
neurologically-mediated perception. I ended up thinking about these questions 
through the phenomenon of epigenetic processes precisely because I am interested in 
thinking about bodies’ responsive self-transformation. In my view, to be a biocultural 
creature is to constantly compose, decompose, and recompose; in those processes, 
genes and proteins are of course key, as are epigenetic processes. In lay 
understandings of genetics, there have conventionally been the two poles of 
determination and randomness: determination by genes and transformation via 
stochastic mutation. Epigenetic processes blow apart that framework because they 
are processes by which bodies shift the ways they compose, decompose, and 
recompose in response to their experiences of their lived worlds. What I find 
interesting about epigenetic processes is that they are neither determined nor random. 
Instead, they evince a patterning that is linked somehow with a rich mix of material 
and social provocations and experiences; they are patterned forms of responsive 
transformation that are evoked and have effects across regulatory systems and across 
temporal scales. 
Although I haven’t done the analysis myself, I think you could probably trace 
out the ways in which immune system processes are also forms of attention and 
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meaning-making—I’m thinking here of Pradeu and Carosella’s (2006) account of the 
immune system not as a strict self-other monitoring system but instead as a form of 
attunement to things that support or undermine continuity of biological functioning. 
I think this could be figured as a form of meaningful perception, for sure. I think it is 
equally possible to think in terms of meaning-making when considering the 
microbiome, social neuroendocrinology, and mirror neurons. 
Ultimately, I am interested in the ways that meaning-making could occur at 
different scales and in different systems of the body, such that what we call 
subjectivity has many layers and textures—including the linguistic but also including 
the temporal and physical scales bound up with epigenetic processes. I don’t know 
that I would aim for a completely synthetic and integrated account of subjectivity; I 
think the effects of these systems and processes on one another are uneven and 
unpredictable. However, I do think there are political, ecological, social, and personal 
insights to be drawn from an understanding of the self that includes the meaning-
making self-transfomative responsiveness of these different biological/biocultural 
processes—such an account could help us rethink power relations, inequality, stress, 
discrimination, green space, urban space, nutrition, pollution and toxins…. The 
aspiration here is similar, perhaps, to the transversally complex account of mental 
health that Rose, Birk, and Manning recently articulated (2021). 
 
l (TT) In the section on Indexical Signs, you argue that ‘arbitrary linguistic 
convention has blinded us to other forms of signification in which there is a 
tighter relationship between a sign and its object.’ An object can work as a 
sign. You emphasize that there can be a clear ‘causal’ relationality between 
sign and its object/referent, and connection between object as a sign and the 
person.  You also support Eduard Kohn’s criticism about anthropocentrism 
which can restrict account of non-linguistic signification. Hence, rather than 
applying ‘the intertwinement of post-structuralist psychoanalysis and 
linguistics, you find Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotics to be useful in 
accounting for ‘the non-symbolic, non-arbitrary relationship between sign 
and object in mementos’ (Frost 2020: 9 emphasis added).  Sign systems 
studies has developed with and been influenced by structuralism. ‘One of the 
central tenets of structuralism concerns the relational nature of a system like 
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the system of language’ (Kull, Emmeche and Hoffmeyer, 2011:5-6). 
According to Kull et al, ‘structuralism in linguistics --- has been an important 
step in the formation of a semiotic approach that looks for relations of 
signification even beyond the human domain of social structures.’ (Kull, 
Emmeche and Hoffmeyer, 2011:5-6, emphasis added).1 Here, it seems that 
‘relationality’ can be a key explanatory term for both your argument and 
structuralism. I wonder if you could explain more your view of semiotics and 
its relation to linguistic structuralism? 
(SF) There is a lot going on in this question! It has been a long time since I studied 
this, but my understanding of structuralist theories of language is that they privilege 
analytically signs that have an arbitrary relationship to what we might call the real 
world and whose meanings are thus generated through the differential values 
manifest in systemic relations between the signs in a linguistic system. Post-
structuralist theories of language challenged structuralism by pointing to the 
instability and indeterminacy of the sign-values and relations—what seems to anchor 
a system of signs does not actually anchor it well; the system is open, history and 
personality make meaning exceed the structured terms of the system. I can see how 
the structuralist focus on systemic relations between signs could provide a template 
that bio-semioticians could use to lay on maps of biological processes: one could say 
“these biological processes constitute a structured system and thus we can think of 
these biological processes as constituting a structured sign system.” And indeed, 
although I have not read deeply in the biosemiotics literature, this could be said to be 
the way that some scholars in biosemiotics proceed. 
For me, though, the insights of post-structuralism remain pertinent, especially 
when thinking about biological processes. If bodies are relatively and selectively 
porous, then they are not closed systems; if we are biocultural creatures, then we are 
open systems, layered systems, with transcalar histories that affect how our biological 
processes unfold. The intrinsic and necessary openness of biological processes is in 
tension with a formally structural account of sign processes. Furthermore, my sense 
is that structuralist accounts of language portray linguistic subjects as relatively 
 
1 Kull, Kalveni, Claus Emmeche and Jesper Hoffmeyer (2011) Why Biosemiotics? An 
Introduction to Our View on The Biology of Life Itself in Towards a Semiotic Biology, Life is 
the Action of Signs, London: Imperial College Press. 
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passive—it is not that you speak a language but rather that, as they say, the language 
speaks you. My understanding of the distinctive challenge posed by Peirce’s theory 
of language is that it is concerned not primarily with the relations between abstract 
or ideal signs but rather the relations between signs, referents, and interpretants—the 
latter being the creatures who use signs and make meanings with them as they 
navigate the social and material world. And what I find particularly interesting is his 
sense that the interpretant is interpreting, that is, is doing work, making meaning, 
acting. So for me, because I am particularly interested in concepts that do not render 
the body passive and merely mechanistically reactive, but instead active and 
transformatively responsive, I would not deploy a structuralist template to think 
about biosemiosis. If we are mapping the processes by which bodies engage and use 
their lived worlds, I think the processes of biosemiosis are just messier, more layered, 
and more open to disturbance than structuralism can allow. Since biological 
processes concern not just the world at a distance but instead taking the world in—
absorbing it, transforming while transforming it, excreting it—I would resist trying 
to fit Peirce’s account of language into a structuralist framework. In the end, what 
drew me to Peirce’s account of the index is the sense he has of contact with the world 
of objects and people and of labile meaning-making in the process of living. 
 
l (TT) You mention that signs are not arbitrary, but more determinant. The 
view could lead to the idea that meaning-making processes in organisms are 
based on sign-processing, rather than symbol-processing. What strikes me 
is that there are some similarities here with debates in media theory involving 
those who are working on computer information in digital humanities. 
Katherine Hayles, for example, explores similar functions between machine 
cognition and biological cognition to develop her notion, ‘cognitive 
nonconscious’ (Hayles 2017:2)2, which includes technical as well as organic 
cognizers. In her discussion, she thinks that biosemiosis approach is useful 
to understand meaning-making processes in both machine and organic 
cognition. She is of course fully aware of the huge differences in embodiment 
between computational media and biological organisms. Computers do not 
 
2 Hayles, N. Katherine (2017) Unthought, The Power of the Cognitive Nonconscious, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
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evolve, like organisms which have the imperative to survive, but they 
accomplish their ‘given’ purpose in the existing environment. She further 
explains that computers work based on ““if/else” command: If a certain set 
of criteria are present, do the following; if not, then do something else.’ For 
her, this command can be understood as computational semiosis which 
implies ‘sign-exchanges’ (Hayles and Sampson 2018:63) 
 
More importantly, she explains that Jesper Hoffmeyer uses the Peircian model 
of sign/object/interpretant in developing the idea of biosemiosis (Hayles and 
Sampson 2018 :62-63)3 and emphasizes the importance of the ‘interpretant’ 
who is the ‘“someone” for whom the sign-processes have meaning – and the 
ground level of meaning for lifeforms is survival’ (Hayles and Sampson 
2018:63).  
 
You also explore who might be the interpreter (‘a sign of a prior sign’) of a 
sign in biological processes (Frost 2020:26). You argue that ‘the indexicality 
of epigenetic processes predicates the body as both originator and interpreter 
of semiosis, since ‘the indexical manner in which a body’s epigenetic 
responses to its experiences generate physical transformation in chromatin 
(Frost 2020:26 emphasis added).  
    
In this sense, one might consider that there might be a mechanical difference 
between organisms with/in ‘the body’ and computers (without the fleshed 
body). Given such possible discrepancy, I wonder how you consider the 
theoretical relationship/difference between your understanding of epigenetic 
process in organisms and the meaning-making process in computational 
systems?  
(SF) You are right that I am working within a framework in which the category of 
“sign” is more capacious and inclusive of more kinds of sign than the category of 
“symbol”. And you are right that, drawing on Peirce’s argument about indexes, I 
argue that indexes are signs that have a more determinant relation to their referents 
 
3 Hayles, N. Katherine and Tony D. Sampson (2018) Unthought Meets the Assemblage Brain, 
Capacious: Journal of Emerging Affect Inquiry 1 (2): 60-84. 
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than, say, linguistic symbols do. I hedge my answer a little bit here because if we 
pluralize the kinds of signs that are possible to include in an analysis—icons, indexes, 
symbols, for instance—and if those different kinds of signs have different kinds of 
relations to their referents, then we have to consider carefully the conditions in which 
we speak of “signs” in general, “signs” without a qualifier. 
That said, I have to confess that I do not know much at all about computational 
systems, artificial intelligence, or the digital humanities. So I can only address your 
question from a very thin knowledge base. For me, the key point in your question is 
Hayles’ recognition that “the ground level of meaning for lifeforms is survival.” This 
idea of a creature for whom life is at stake in its engagement with its lived world—
this suggests to me that perhaps the distinction in question is not one between sign 
processing and signal processing but instead between sign/signal processing and 
meaning-making, i.e. interpretation. I am unsure whether sign-processing and 
meaning-making are the same thing. Hayles is clear that signal processing is linear 
in its logic. And to reference your earlier question, the notion of sign-processing 
seems structural or systemic in that it concerns inferential relations between signs. 
But interpretation and meaning-making seem more personal in the sense that there 
are stakes, a sense of value, judgment, intimacy, or involvement. For instance, when 
I read the work of Jakob von Uexkull (2010) or Georges Canguilhem (1991; 2008)—
both of whom are key thinkers for scholars who study biosemiosis—I notice that 
whereas they are often portrayed as discussing the ways that perceptual processes 
generate a milieu, the details of their arguments concern not mere perception but 
instead use and activity: what makes something meaningful is the remembered and 
anticipated use of the thing—whatever it is. I suppose that in this context, I consider 
epigenetic processes as a kind of use, or as Agamben might say, in The Use of Bodies 
(2015), a using of the self in the process of using the world. Once you shift to thinking 
about epigenetic processes as indexical forms of attention, and then you predicate the 
living creature as a whole as that which pays attention, then you are no longer talking 
only of the mechanics of molecular scale processes inside a body; you are talking 
about a living creature whose various forms of meaning-making are bound up with 
their persistence in living, with their living their lives.  
But if I keep thinking through your question, I suppose it is possible that if AI 
systems could become complex enough at navigating and parsing social and material 
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worlds, the distinctive logic of the mediated inferential patterns by which epigenetic 
processes function as indexical forms of attention and meaning-making might be 




l (TT) You draw attention to Yoshimi Kawade’s biological function of a molecule 
(Frost 2020:15). Kawade was strongly influenced by Jacob von Uexkull’s 
notion of ‘umwelt.’  Kawade considered that ‘signs and their meanings start 
as biological relations that emerge together in the course of life, “as living 
beings live with their own subjectivity, interacting each other and projecting 
their subjectivity onto the environment’ (Kawade 1998:288 in cited Favareau 
& Kull 2020: 205-206)4.  Here, subjective orientation is important. We can 
understand, thus, meaning-making processes are determined by a subject 
with a specific world-view. For Kawade, ‘All living things, including single-
celled organisms, have a certain degree of freedom from physical causality 
to choose their actions with intentions to fulfill their purpose,’ (Kawade 2013: 
367 emphasis added).5 This could raise the question – could we understand 
a single cell organism as an agentic entity as having intentions? I wonder 
that if we can follow his remarks and consider even single-celled organisms 
has intentions, it might be possible to consider whether or not a single 
organism has subjectivity?  What do you think and how we better understand 
subjectivity in an organism? 
(SF) You’re right that I find Kawade’s research a provocative resource; the fact that 
he is well-versed in laboratory science makes his work really useful to me. I think 
perhaps my training as a political theorist makes me more wary than he of terms like 
purpose and intentions. For me, the notion of purpose is too redolent of the notion of 
teleology and actually undercuts the indeterminacy of action that Kawade is 
 
4 Favareau, Donald & Kalevi Kull (2020) chapter 14 A Biosemiotician of the First Generation: 
205-206) (Eds.)Youichiro, Iwakura et al. Seimeitoha Nanika wo toitsuzukete – 
Bunshiseibutugaku no sakie, (What is the Life – beyond Biosemiotics) Kyoto, Kyoto Daigaku 
Gakujyutu Shuttpankai (Kyoto University Press). 
5 Yoshimi Kawade (2013) The Origin of Mind: The Mind-matter Continuity Thesis, 
Biosemiotics 6: 367-378. 
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otherwise interested to highlight. But the notion of intention is one that I draw on in 
my “Attentive Body” essay, although it is important to note that I use it differently 
than Kawade uses it—and thus the way you use it in your question. 
In my article, I use the notion of intentionality rather than intention. In 
philosophical terms, intentionality denotes an orientation towards a specific 
something when we engage in an action, an orientation such that our action is “about” 
the thing. In other words, in this inflection of the term, an action is said to be 
intentional when it is referential. Another meaning of the term, which is the second 
noted above, concerns when a subject posits him- or herself as an agent, imagines 
doing a particular something, and then sets out to do it. This version, then, turns on 
both an explicit anticipatory notion of the self as agent of a specific action and a sense 
or experience of willfulness in relation to realizing an anticipated action. While I am 
quite happy to attribute the first “referential” version of intentionality to single-celled 
organisms, I am more reluctant to attribute to them this second version, in part 
because the latter requires more complex forms of mentation and a more refined 
sense of self in a temporally complex field of action than I think single-celled 
organisms can muster.  
Part of my argument in the “Attentive Body” article is that epigenetic processes 
are intentional in that they are referential, even if that referentiality is somewhat 
mediated. In such biological processes, a self ends up being functionally predicated 
even if not consciously held as an idea. Is a self the same thing as a subject? This is 
a question that is up for debate. But as of now, in my view, because intentionality-
qua-referentiality and a functional sense of self are integral to many biological 
processes, I would venture to affirm that single-celled organisms have a functional 
sense of self, even if I would not yet go so far as to say that they are subjects. For 
creatures who are more than single-celled—bigger, more complex—I would not 
hesitate to attribute subjectivity to them. Of course, it would not be what we think of 
as linguistic subjectivity…. I suppose that part of what I am trying to do in my work 
is elaborate an account of extra-linguistic subjectivity, and it is not all worked out yet. 
What could the pieces of the argument that I have developed so far mean for a 
theory of subjectivity? Mostly that subjectivity is deeply layered and textured, 
striated and temporally complex—more so than we have captured in even our richest 
theoretical pictures. When humans come into linguistic subjectivity, all those other 
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facets of attention and responsive self-transformation—whether epigenetic, 
immunitary, microbiomic, or endocrinal—subtend that more self-consciously or 
explicitly imagined and experienced sense of self. The notion of the attentive body 
that I develop in the article is not supposed to supplant other understandings of the 
self and subjectivity. It is more an effort to capture conceptually and in theoretical 
terms the fact that, in addition to language, psyche, affect, identity, movement, and 
extended cognition, there is this further dimension of the self that is attentive and 
engaged, that is not managed by the extended neurological system but nevertheless 
exhibits intentionality or referentiality in processes that shape the subject’s growth 
and capacities. In all likelihood, this attentive dimension of the self that I draw out 
modulates the other dimensions in various ways—although I have not yet done the 
work to specify that.  
 
l (TT) Finally, could you let us know more about your research project at the 
IPRH-Mellon Biohumanities Research and what are you working on now, as 
well as how you want to develop it in relation to possible future research 
projects? 
(SF) The IPRH-Mellon Biohumanities Research Initiative was a 2 year 
interdisciplinary research program I directed at the University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign, funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and hosted by the Illinois 
Program for Research in the Humanities—which is now known as the Humanities 
Research Institute. The purpose of the initiative was to explore the contours, 
questions, and methods that animate the emerging field of biohumanities. To my 
mind, the work of the biohumanities is to develop accounts of human being that can 
both accommodate the wealth of contemporary scientific research and provide 
conceptually rich accounts of humans, their behaviors, and their cultures. Thus, the 
biohumanities is distinguished from, say, science and technology studies, by its 
critical and creative appropriation of findings in the biological sciences for the 
purpose of reimagining and reconfiguring our sense of human being and of the 
meaning and significance of human undertakings. 
Within the Biohumanities initiative, rather than pursuing one specific research 
project, the various fellows conducted a variety of research projects, participated in 
an on-going seminar, and exchanged ideas with a range of visitors whose research 
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falls near or within the purview of the biohumanities. We were trying to figure out 
what the biohumanities might be, what methods would be appropriate to the field—
basically, how to talk about and do it! While I directed the initiative over the 2 year 
period, I worked through the argument of the attentive body article and traced the 
outlines of the larger project of which it is the foundational part. In the larger project, 
I am really trying to figure out and articulate this theory of the subject and what it 
might mean for our understanding of politics. Now that I have figured out the 
attentive body argument, I am working through the next step.  
The conundrum that structures the next piece of the project is that whereas a lot 
of work on the biocultural or the biosocial has disrupted the boundaries of the self 
and worked to articulate a composite, hybrid phenomenon, the lived world or the 
environment that is construed as occasioning or generating that composite hybrid is 
still conceived as an external spatial field. While the conceptual fusion of body and 
world has resulted in a differently rendered concept of a living creature, that fusion 
has not had a similarly transformative effect on the notion of the lived environment. 
The latter remains true to its history as a spatial concept; the world that provokes 
responsive self-transformation remains bound to a spatial schematic. And of course, 
if we consider the factors that affect epigenetic processes, they are not only or 
primarily spatial—they are imaginative, felt, anticipatory, remembered, temporally 
complex. So the question animating this next part of my project is: what concepts do 
we need to be able to think about the lived world or the environment not primarily as 
a spatial externality with which a biocultural creature has a self-transformative, self-
constituting relation. 
As I intimated above, for me, the clues are in Uexkull’s and Canguilhem’s 
notion of use—remembered and anticipated use as constitutive of meaning. In The 
Use of Bodies, Giorgio Agamben deploys the concept of use as a means to side step 
the question of relation. For Agamben, as for several other contemporary theorists, 
relation as a concept predicates two originally separate and distinct entities whose 
gap requires the relation as a copula or bridge. Agamben suggests that the sundering 
performed by the notion of relation can be foreclosed by the notion of use, which 
implies not only an intimacy between a (using) creature and a (used) thing but their 
mutual (self) transformation through the process of using. Then, through a series of 
theoretical moves, Agamben argues that habitual use is a form of life—and what I 
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like about this formulation is that it is not primarily spatial! It allows us to say that 
what attentive bodies pay attention to is a mode of living, not a spatial field of forces. 
 I am currently working through this problematic. And as luck would have it, I 
have entered into a collaboration with two Chicago area artists—Sara Black and 
Amber Ginsburg. With a collaborative fellowship funded by the Mellon Foundation 
and hosted by the University of Chicago’s Gray Center for Arts and Inquiry, we are 
exploring the connection between attention-as-responsive-self-transformation and 
mode-of-living-as-form-of-life. We are just now beginning our project in earnest and 
are focusing our attention on a combination of tree ecologies, food hedges, and 
environmental justice concerns. Thinking with Sara and Amber in collaboration, 
digging around in dirt, and engaging actual neighbourhoods is a very different way 
for me to work, but is also super fun. 
And once I have figured out how to explain all these ideas well, then I will trace 
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